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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE,
(Plaintiff)Appellant,

:
:

-v-

•

JOHN PAINTER,

:

(Defendant)Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Case No. 86 0399
Category 13b.

:
ooOoo

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error

in determining that no agistment bailment agreement existed
between the parties;
2.

Whether the District Court committed reversible error

in determining that Mr. Painter, a landowner, had no duty to
check on, or report to Mr. Smurthwaite on the condition of,
certain Appaloosa race-bred broodmares which Mr. Smurthwaite
pastured, for a fee, on Mr. Painter's land;
3.

Whether the determinative findings of the District

Court (regardless of whether they are styled "Findings of
Fact" or "Conclusions of Law,") are supported by substantial
evidence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Mr. Smurthwaite requests (1) that this Court determine
that, as a matter of law, an agistment bailment agreement
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existed between the parties; (2) that this Court determine
that there is no support for the putative proposition that
the subject horses would have died but for the negligence of
Mr. Painter; (3) that this Court rule that, by reason of the
existence of an agistment bailment agreement between the
parties and by reason of Mr. Painter's failure to carry his
burden of showing that he discharged his lawful duty of care
and that the horses died by reason other than Mr. Painter's
negligence, Mr. Smurthwaite's supposed negligence ought not to
have been considered; and (4) that this Court reverse the
District Court's Judgment and remand to the District Court
with directions to enter Judgment for Mr. Smurthwaite and to
make an appropriate damages determination.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Smurthwaite, the plaintiff below, appeals from
the Judgment of the District Court.

Mr. Smurthwaite was an

owner and breeder of race-bred Appaloosa horses.

In the fall

of 1981, he and Mr. Painter, an owner, lessee, or person
otherwise in control of land located on the eastern shore of
the Great Salt Lake in or near Syracuse, in Davis County,
State of Utah, entered into an oral agreement, pursuant to
which Mr. Smurthwaite brought his broodmare band to the
property and, for a payment of $15.00 per head per month,
received pasturage rights for his horses and, according to
Mr. Smurthwaite's testimony below, the assurance that
Mr. Painter, who lived adjacent to the property in question,
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would keep his eye on the horses and let Mr. Smurthwaite know
if any of the horses required attention.
In the proceedings in the District Court, Mr. Smurthwaite
pursued his claims against Mr. Painter, through trial, on two
alternative theories:

simple breach of contract and breach of

an agistment bailment agreement, both arising from the death,
during the winter of 1983-84, of ten of Mr. Smurthwaite's
broodmares.

The District Court found that the agreement was

for pasturage only and ruled against Mr. Smurthwaite and in
favor of Mr. Painter, no cause of action.

Mr. Smurthwaite

appeals therefrom.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that the following
is a statement of undisputed facts material to the disposition
of this Appeal:
1.

At all times material hereto, defendant-respondent

John Painter owned, held as lessee under one or more lease
agreements, or otherwise controlled certain land 350-390 acres
in size (hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the subject land")
located near 1700 South State near the Great Salt Lake in or
near Syracuse in Davis County, State of Utah.
2.

Record at 95.

At all times material hereto, Mr. Painter, who has

lived virtually his entire life in the immediate vicinity
of the subject land, lived in a house adjacent to the subject
land, and Mr. Smurthwaite lived in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, approximately 35 miles from the subject land.
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Record at

96; Tr., Vol. II, at 27.
3.

In the fall of 1981, Mr. Smurthwaite and Mr. Painter

entered into an oral agreement, automatically renewable on a
month-to-month basis, concerning Mr. Smurthwaite1s pasturing
of his Appaloosa horses on the subject land.
4.

Record at 95.

According to the terms of the said agreement,

Mr. Smurthwaite was to pay to Mr. Painter $15.00 per head per
month for each horse that Mr. Smurthwaite placed or caused to
be placed on the subject land.
5.

Record at 95.

In or about the fall of 1981 and from time to time

thereafter, Mr. Smurthwaite, pursuant to the said agreement,
placed and caused to be placed Appaloosa horses on the subject
land, and through at least December 5, 1983, all such horses
were in good flesh and not nearing starvation.

Record at 95;

Tr., Vol. II, at 37, 56, 135.
6.

At some time subsequent to the commencement of the said

month-to-month relationship with Mr. Smurthwaite, Mr. Painter
entered into an agreement with one Robert Child, according
to the terms of which Mr. Child obtained the right to pasture
his horses on part of the subject land.
7.

Record at 96.

Mr. Painter was aware and Mr. Smurthwaite testified

that he, Mr. Smurthwaite, was not aware, throughout at least
late December, 1983, and January, 1984, and until the dead horses
were found, in early February, 1984, of the uncontested facts:
(a) that Mr. Childfs horses were, during that period, located
on a portion of the subject land ("the upper pasture")
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visible from the road (1700 South Street) adjacent to which
Mr. Painter's house was located, and (b) that Mr. Smurthwaite's
broodmares were located on a portion of the subject land that
was not visible from the said road ("the lower pasture").
E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 270; Vol. Ill, at 5, 68-69.
8.

At all times material hereto, the upper pasture con-

tained and the lower pasture did not contain much of a grass
known as "crested wheat grass," which grew tall enough to
provide pasturage in inordinately severe winters.

E.g., Tr.,

Vol. II, at 219.
9.

The winter of 1983-84 was an inordinately severe

winter.

Record at 131.
Mr. Painter had heard, prior to Mr. Smurthwaite1s

10.

discovery of the dead horses, that other animals were starving
to death in the vicinity of Mr. Painter's property and that
the Humane Society was investigating.
11.

Tr., Vol. II, at 266-67.

Mr. Smurthwaite did not set foot on the subject

property from on or about December 5, 1983, until February 8,
1984.

Record at 131.

12.

Mr. Smurthwaite testified that he thought that

Mr. Painter would let him know if the horses needed supplemental food in addition to that provided by the pasturage
naturally available.

E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 30, 31, 35;

Vol. Ill, at 68-69.
13.

Mr. Smurthwaite paid Mr. Painter, pursuant to the

subject agreement, sums of money, totaling in excess of
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$5,200.00.
14.

Tr., Vol. Ill, at 69.

Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his agreed-upon

monthly payments during the months of December, 1983 and
January and February, 1984.

E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 56-58,

244-45, 268; Exhibits L, M, N.
15.

On a date or dates in late December, 1983, January,

1984 and/or February, 1984, ten of Mr. Smurthwaite f s Appaloosa
broodmares died of starvation in the lower pasture.
95.

;

Record at

' •
16.

1983-84.
17.

All of Mr. Child's horses survived the winter of
Tr., Vol. II, at 271.
After Mr. Smurthwaite 1 s horses were known to be dead,

Mr. Painter informed Mr. Smurthwaite that Mr. Painter would
retain custody of Mr. Smurthwaite 1 s surviving horses (also
located on the subject land) until Mr. Smurthwaite became
current on his payments.
18.

Tr., Vol. II, at 250.

At the non-jury trial, held before the Honorable

Rodney S. Page, on May 21, 22, and 28, 1986, Mr. Smurthwaite
put on expert testimony of damages in the approximate principal
amount of $94,000.00 for the loss of his broodmares and their
unborn foals.
19.

Tr., Vol. I, at 57-80, Exhibit X.

At trial Mr. Painter put on testimony to show that

the damages, if any, suffered by Mr. Smurthwaite were in the
approximate principal amount of $9,000.00.

Tr., Vol. Ill, at

38."'' '
20.

The District Court took the matter under advisement
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and ultimately ruled and held on behalf of Mr. Painter, no
cause of action.

Record at 133.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Mr. Smurthwaite will not further pursue his simple breachof-contract claim, inasmuch as he accepts, for purposes of
this Appeal, the fact that the District Court, as the trier of
fact, accepted Mr. Painter's version, and not Mr. Smurthwaite's
version, of the oral agreement between the parties. Specifically, Mr. Smurthwaite understands that the office of this
Appeal is not to re-try the issue of whether, as Mr. Smurthwaite
contended below, Mr. Painter specifically and expressly undertook to provide to Mr. Smurthwaite vigilance and information
concerning any difficulties that might beset the horses. The
District Court found, as Mr. Painter contended, that all
Mr. Painter agreed to provide was use of the land and any
pasturage that might be available on it. And, inasmuch as
there was substantial evidence from Mr. Painter, to support
the District Court's finding, with respect to Mr. Painter's
express contractual undertaking, Mr. Smurthwaite will not
further pursue his claim that he was, on a straight breachof-contract theory, entitled to relief.
Mr. Smurthwaite's agistment bailment argument is another
matter entirely.

His pursuit of this Appeal is based on his

contentions (1) that, as a matter of law and as a matter of
public policy, the District Court clearly erred in determining
that the agreement between Mr. Smurthwaite and Mr. Painter did
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not constitute an agistment bailment agreement; (2) that
Mr. Smurthwaite*s proof clearly satisfied the criteria for the
triggering of burden-shifting mechanisms arising from agistment bailment agreements; (3) that, as a matter of law, the
burden thus fell on Mr. Painter to put on evidence supporting
the proposition that he, Mr. Painter, was not negligent and
that the horses did not die as a result of his (Mr. Painter's)
negligence; (4) that the District Court may itself have
impliedly recognized Mr. Painter's negligence; (5) that there
is, in any event, no substantial record support for the proposition that Mr. Painter was not negligent; (6) any putative
finding of Mr. Painter's lack of negligence would be "clearly
erroneous"; and (7) that the

causational link between

Mr. Painter's negligence and the death of the horses is not to
be questioned.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
WAS AN AGISTMENT BAILMENT AGREEMENT.
A.

The Significance of the District
Court's Conclusion of Law

For purposes of this Appeal, Mr. Smurthwaite accepts, as
being based on substantial evidence, the District Court's
Finding of Fact (record at 129 and 132) that Mr. Painter did
not expressly agree to provide anything to Mr. Smurthwaite
other than a place for Mr. Smurthwaite to pasture his horses.
Mr. Smurthwaite does not, however, accept the District Court's
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Conclusion of Law (record at 132) that "the agreement between
the parties was not an agistment agreement . . . ."
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that the Conclusion was
erroneous and that the success or failure of this Appeal
appears to turn on the question of whether the District Court
indeed erred in so concluding.
B.

The Law of Agistment Bailment

"Agistment" has been variously defined as "the particular kind of bailment, under which a man, for consideration
takes in cattle to graze and pasture on his land" (Bramlette
v. Titus, 267 P.2d 620, 622 (Nev. 1954)); "the taking in and
feeding or pasturing of horses, cattle, or similar animals for
a reward" (Marcus v. Eastern Agr. Ass'n, Inc., 58 N.J. Super.
584, 157 A.2d 3, 8 (N.J. App. 1959)); "a temporary pasturing
arrangement" (Frazier v. Kern, 18 Wash.App. 93, 566 P.2d 956,
958 (Wash. App. 1977)); "the pasturing of cattle or similar
animals as a bailee in consideration of an agreed price to be
paid by the owner [of the animals]" (3A C.J.S. Animals §46,
p.514).
Once it has been established that an agistment exists,
certain burden-shifting legal machinery is put into gear.

In

Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315 (Utah 1983), for example, the
Utah Supreme Court explained:
It is well established that a contract to care for
animals for a specified term, an agistment, is a
"species of bailment," and that under such a
contract "there is ordinarily an obligation to
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return or account for the animals at the end of the
term" (emphasis added). Failure to so account may
result in the imposition of liability upon the bailee.
In a recent and similar case involving an agistment
of cattle, the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed
the issue of a bailee's liability for unreturned and
unaccounted for cattle:
Under the law of bailment, if the property
of the bailor is returned damaged or
cannot be returned at all, the bailor, in
order to recover against the bailee, must
show that he first delivered the property
in good condition. If that showing is
made then there arises a presumption that
the bailee is negligent and it casts upon
the bailee the burden of going forward
with evidence to overcome the presumption.
[Citations omitted.]
Id. at 320-21.

In the Baker case, in which the Court

found an agistment to have been created, the bailees had
sought to recover monies allegedly due them from the defendant
cattle owner pursuant to a pasturage agreement.

The Court

recognized the propriety of the plaintiffs' retaining possession of the cattle, pursuant to the agistors1 lien statute,
Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1, until they had been paid.

It is worth

noting that, in the instant case, Mr. Painter, in knowing or
unknowing reliance on that statute, demanded, after the deaths
of Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses, that Mr. Smurthwaite pay monies
due Mr. Painter before Mr. Smurthwaite's remaining horses
would be released to Mr. Smurthwaite. Tr., Vol. II, at 250.
Hughes v. Yardley, 19 Utah 2d 166, 428 P.2d 158 (1967)
was another case involving an agistor's lien and an alleged
breach of the contract of agistment.

It appears that it was
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uncontested, in Hughes, that the agreement between the parties
was, as the District Court found the agreement between the
parties in the instant case to be, one for pasturage only.
428 P.2d at 159.

In Hughes, the trial court found that the

death of 18 of the plaintiff's cattle resulted from negligence
of the defendants in failing to have adequate fences to prevent
the escape of the cattle from the appropriate pasture area
into areas containing green alfalfa (the consumption of which
alfalfa apparently, in turn, caused the cattle to die of
bloat).

The Supreme Court affirmed the findings and conclu-

sions of the trial court, with the exception of the trial
court's non-evidentiary-supported conclusion that appears
(although there is no express discussion by the Court of such
an analysis) to have flown in the face of the common law
burden-shifting rule that was later expressly adopted in
Baker.

The Hughes Court concluded:

We are of the opinion that it was error for the
court to deduct the value of six head of cattle
from the 18 upon the theory that experience would
show that six would have died during the period in
all events.
428 P.2d at 159.
In the instant case it is undisputed that Mr. Painter
agreed, for consideration (or "reward"), to provide pasturage
to plaintiff.

Based on the law as set forth in Baker and by

the facts and the Court's analysis in Hughes, an agistment
bailment contract clearly existed.
Cases from other jurisdictions finding that agistment
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contracts inhered in pasturing arrangements include Ward v.
Newell, 315 S.E.2d 721 (N.C. App. 1984) (wherein the court
also observed that "ordinary care" was required of the
agistor-bailee and restated the rule that such a degree of
care is that "which men of ordinary prudence take of their own
property of a similar kind under like circumstances."

Id. at

723); Cox v. Pithoud, 221 Cal.App. 2d 571, 34 Cal. Rptr. 582
(1963) (wherein the court, in affirming the trial court, also
held that the appellant, as an agistor, was liable for his
negligence in connection with the loss to starvation of the
appellee's cattle); and Vaughan v. Bixby, 142 Pac. 100 (Cal.
App. 1914) wherein the court stated:
One who takes in horses to pasture . . . is
termed an agister . . . . While he is not an
insurer against injury to or loss of the stock
intrusted to his keeping, he is bound to take
reasonable care thereof, and injury or loss
resulting from ordinary casualties that could
have been averted by the exercise of such
reasonable care constitutes negligence for which
he is responsible.
See, also, 3A C.J.S. Animals §§40, et seq.; §§46, et seq. ;
and 8 C.J.S. Bailments §§50, et seq.

Also instructive is an

article written by Murray Loring, D.V.M., J.D., appearing in
the December 1983 edition of Appaloosa News, pp. 98-99, and
entitled "Legal Aspects of a Horse Bailment."

A copy of that

article is, with Mr. Smurthwaite•s counsel's apologies for the
highlightings and scribblings, made part of the Addendum
hereto.
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C.

Allen v. Southern Pacific Co.,
Public Policy Considerations,
the Agistors' Lien Statute
and The Animal Cruelty Statute

If the Court is hesitant expressly to adopt the pasturagefor-reward standard for the creation of an agistment bailment
relationship, or the "reasonable owner" rule for its application, the Court is respectfully invited to consider the rule
adopted by this Court given in the case of Allen v. Southern
Pacific Co., 117 Utah 171, 213 P.2d 667 (1950).
Allen was not an agistment bailment case but a losttraveling-bag-and-contents bailment case.

Mr. Allen had

checked with the railway company a bag and contents, of a
total value found by the trial court to be $2,910.00, "which
for a consideration was to be kept by respondent safely and
securely until returned to appellant."

213 P.2d at 668. At the

time Mr. Allen checked the bag he was given a receipt, on one
side of which was printed a legend purporting to limit the
railway's liability to $25.00.

To the same effect was a sign

posted in the room where Mr. Allen checked the bag.

The trial

court found that Mr. Allen read neither the receipt nor the
sign and that the railway's agents did not call to Mr. Allen's
attention the contents of either notice.

The trial court also

found that the railway "failed to take due care of or safely
keep" (id.) Mr. Allen's property and instead gave the property
to another person. The trial court determined that the railway
company's liability was contractually limited to $25.00.
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Mr. Allen appealed to the Utah Supreme Court on the
question of whether the trial court correctly ruled that his
entitlement to damages was so limited.

The Court observed:

Ordinarily, a bailee for hire is responsible for
the value of the goods entrusted to him if it is
lost or destroyed. However, the parties may enter
into a valid agreement to modify the obligations
which would otherwise arise from the relationship
of bailor and bailee if it ". . . does not violate
the law or contravene public policy, and so long as
it is actually a part of the contract of bailment
and is expressed in clear and unmistakable
language . . . ." [Citations omitted.] The great
weight of authority is that a bailee cannot
entirely exempt himself by contract from liability
due to his negligence and contracts limiting his
liability for negligence during the course of a
general business with the public are usually
regarded as being against the public policy.
[Citations omitted.]
Id.

(Emphasis added.)

The Court went on to rule in Mr. Allen's

favor, reversing the trial court and remanding with instructions
that Mr. Allen be granted judgment for the full $2,190.00.
213 P.2d at 670.
Mr. Smurthwaite concedes that the Allen Court's analysis
did not deal expressly with public policy considerations, but,
rather, was based on the trial court's findings that Mr. Allen
had no actual knowledge of the purported limitation on
liability and that the limitation language was not called to
his attention.

Mr. Smurthwaite also recognizes that, strictly

speaking, even the dictum reference in Allen to public policy
considerations may be meaningless in the absence of this
Court's determination that the arrangement between the parties
hereto constituted an agistment bailment.

Mr. Smurthwaite
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suggests, nonetheless, that that reference provides an
analytical springboard for this Court's consideration of the
very important public policy concerns that are at the heart of
this Appeal.
Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1 provides and has, at all times
material hereto, provided:
Every ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle,
tavern keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any
domestic animals shall be entrusted for the purpose
of feeding, herding or pasturing shall have a lien
upon such animals for the amount that may be due him
for such feeding, herding or pasturing and is
authorized to retain possession of such animals
until such amount is paid.
(Emphasis added.)
As indicated in items 14 and 15 of the Statement of
Facts appearing hereinabove, it is not disputed that, as
of the time or times, in December of 1983, January of 1984,
or very early February of 1984, that Mr. Smurthwaite's
horses died, Mr. Smurthwaite was in arrears on his payment
obligation to Mr. Painter.

And, though the record is

silent as to whether he was consciously aware of his
express statutory right, Mr. Painter himself exercised
his agistor's lien right, with respect to certain of
Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses that somehow avoided starvation.
Tr., Vol. Ill, at 17.
Research has failed to unearth any case or other
authority on point, but Mr. Smurthwaite suggests that
Mr. Painter's statutory right to retain possession of the
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horses at the time or times of their deaths may constitute "custody" of the animals, at least for purposes of
the public policy concerns inherent herein.
Utah Code Ann. §76-9-301 provides and has, at all times
material hereto, provided, in pertinent part:
(1)

A person commits cruelty to animals if he
intentionally or knowingly . . .
(b)

Fails to provide necessary food, care,
or shelter for an animal in his custody; or

(c)

Abandons an animal in his custody

. . . .

(Emphasis added.)
Mr. Smurthwaite does not suggest that persons in
Mr. Painter's position should be prosecuted for cruelty
to animals in connection with events such as those involved
herein.

He recognizes that, for criminal prosecution

purposes, the step-by-step analysis suggested herein
would, in all likelihood, not be accepted.

For example,

regardless of Mr. Painter's legal right, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §38-2-1, to refuse any putative request by
Mr. Smurthwaite for release of the horses when payments
for their pasturing were overdue, no such request was
made prior to the horses' starvation.

Nor is it likely

that the "intentionally or knowingly" standard of the
animal cruelty statute could be satisfied in a case such
as this, wherein Mr. Painter has testified that he thought,
while the horses were dwindling toward their deaths, that
Mr. Smurthwaite was "checkin1 on 'em."

Tr., Vol. Ill, at
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Given facts such as these, it is most unlikely that

a prosecutor would seek conviction of Mr. Painter under either
§76-9-301(1)(b) or (c).
The facts remain, however,
(1)

that Mr. Painter had, for virtually his entire

life and during the 1983-84 winter, lived in the immediate
vicinity of where Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses were pastured and
died (Record at 96; Tr., Vol. II, at 27);
(2)

that Mr. Smurthwaite lived in Murray, Salt Lake

County (some 30-35 miles from the property) during the winter
of 1983-84 (Record at 131);
(3)

that Mr. Painter knew that Mr. Smurthwaite1s

horses were in an area where they were not readily observable
(E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 270; Vol. Ill, at 5 ) ;
(4)

that that area did not have sufficient tall,

crested wheat grass that might be expected to provide sufficient nourishment for Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses in severe
winter weather and snow cover (E.g., Tr., Vol. II, at 219);
and
(5)

that Mr. Painter was aware that the winter of

1983-84 was "the worst winter in quite a few winters" (Tr.,
Vol. Ill, at 15).
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully submits that it is facts
such as these that shine the spotlight on public policy
concerns that might otherwise continue to lie in the shadows
of our jurisprudence for decades longer than they have already
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Specifically, Mr. Smurthwaite suggests that Mr. Painter's

unquestioned knowledge of the whereabouts of the horses and
of the unavailability to them, in that location, during that
winter, of natural pasturage, constitutes precisely the kind
of knowledge that bailees in the non-agistment context typically have and that their counterpart bailors typically do not
have.

Mr. Smurthwaite submits, further, that the public

policy of the State of Utah, embodied in manifestations such
as the animal cruelty statute, would be, for the bailment
analysis purposes mentioned in Allen and otherwise, served by
this Court's express adoption of the rule that an agreement
for "pasturage only" constitutes an agistment bailment and
imposes on the agistor-bailee the concomitant duty of care.
Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully suggests that, if this Court
declines to do so, in the rubric of Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1,
M

[e]very ranchman, farmer, agistor, herder of cattle, tavern

keeper or livery stable keeper to whom any domestic animals
shall be entrusted for the purpose of . . . pasturing" may,
with impunity and in the face of the policies clearly underlying the animal cruelty statute, receive and bank the money
of the owner of livestock and not be answerable in damages to
that owner for even the most blatantly negligent act or omission.

A person in Mr. Painter's position might, for example,

be able to receive payments from a person such as
Mr. Smurthwaite and, without fear of civil liability,
literally sit comfortably on a porch swing drinking a beer or
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a Coca-Cola and watching that person's horse or cow being
tortured or painfully starving to death.
owner" of the horse or cow do that?

Would a "reasonable

Does the public policy of

the State of Utah countenance such a result?
POINT II
ALL ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO TRIGGER THE
BURDEN SHIFTING MECHANISM OF AGISTMENT
BAILMENT AGREEMENTS WERE ESTABLISHED.
If the Court does not accept the foregoing agistment
bailment analysis or otherwise come to the conclusion that an
agistment bailment agreement existed between the parties
hereto, there is, in all likelihood, no purpose to be served
by the Court's further consideration of this Appeal.

If, on

the other hand, the Court is persuaded that, as a matter of
law and contrary to the District Court's conclusion, the
parties' relationship was one of that description, it follows
inexorably that Mr. Smurthwaite should prevail on this Appeal.
As the New Mexico Supreme Court has observed in New
Mexico Feeding Co. v. Keck, 95 N.M. 615, 624 P.2d 1012, 1017
(1981), a case involving an agistment of cattle (which rule
of law has, as indicated hereinabove, been expressly approved
by this Court in Baker v. Hansen, 666 P.2d 315, 320-21 (Utah
1983)) :
Under the law of bailment, if the property of the
bailor . . . is returned damaged or cannot be
returned at all, the bailor, in order to recover
against bailee, must show that he first delivered
the property in good condition. If that showing is
made then there arises a presumption that the
bailee is negligent and it casts upon the bailee
the burden of going forward with evidence to
overcome the presumption.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is clear beyond cavil (1) that Mr. Smurthwaite1s
horses died (could "not be returned at all"), (see, e.g.,
Record at 95); and (2) that Mr. Smurthwaite delivered the
horses "in good condition" (see, e.g., Tr., Vol. Ill, at 37, 56).
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT FIND THAT
MR. PAINTER WAS NOT NEGLIGENT OR THAT
A FACTOR OTHER THAN HIS NEGLIGENCE CAUSED
THE DEATH OF MR. SMURTHWAITE'S HORSES.
The next appropriate step in the analysis is to determine
what the District Court had to say concerning Mr. Painter's
negligence, or the lack thereof.

A review of the Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law (record at 128-133) in this regard
is most instructive.

The only finding in this regard is

denominated a conclusion of law.

It is unnumbered and it

appears at pages 132 and 133 of the record.

It immediately

follows this Conclusion of Law:
The Court further concludes that the defendant had
no duty to care for the livestock or inspect the
animals nor even to report on their condition under
the circumstances of this case.
It consists of the following:
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out
that duty, the Court would conclude that plaintiff
in failing to inspect his stock from December 5,
1983, to February 7, 1984, was negligent himself and
that said negligence was at least equal to, if not
greater, than that of the defendant.
(Emphasis added.)
Mr. Smurthwaite suggests that the District Court's own
implicit finding that Mr. Painter was negligent may, in and of
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itself, herald the end of the inquiry.

For, as this Court

appears to have recognized in Baker v. Hansen, if the bailee
(Mr. Painter) has failed (as he appears to have) to carry his
burden of showing that he was not negligent, the District Court
(subject to this Court's acceptance of the foregoing agistment
bailment law analysis) should have ruled in Mr. Smurthwaite's
favor.

If there is any doubt, for purposes of actual and

proximate cause analysis, concerning Mr. Smurthwaite's entitlement to the relief requested herein, the Court is invited to
consider from a common sense perspective and from an uncontested evidentiary perspective (see, e.g., Tr., Vol. Ill, at
68-69) the fact that Mr. Smurthwaite would have, had he known
of the danger, gotten current on his payments and moved his
horses to a location where they would not have starved to
death.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL RECORD SUPPORT
FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT MR. PAINTER
WAS NOT NEGLIGENT OR FOR THE PROPOSITION
THAT HIS NEGLIGENT OMISSION TO NOTIFY
MR. SMURTHWAITE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE DEATHS OF MR. SMURTHWAITE'S
HORSES.
Mr. Smurthwaite is aware of the standard of review of
this Court pertaining to District Court Findings of Fact.

He

also recognizes that it would likely be a matter of elevating
form over substance for him to attack the District Court's
Judgment on the basis that it appears erroneously to have
denominated what appear to be findings of fact as conclusions
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of law.

In the event, therefore, that the District Court is

determined to have found, regardless of what appears to be its
finding to the contrary, that Mr. Painter was not negligent,
Mr. Smurthwaite endeavors to set forth, in the succeeding
paragraphs, the paucity of the record evidence in support of
such a finding.
It is not disputed that Mr. Painter never notified or
sought to notify Mr. Smurthwaite, during the particularly
harsh winter in question (see, e.g., tr., Vol. Ill, at
48-49), that he, Mr. Smurthwaite, ought to check on, or have
Mr. Painter check on, the conditions of his horses.
Mr. Painter's contention that he was not negligent in
failing so to notify Mr. Smurthwaite appears to be based
solely on his claim that, as indicated hereinabove, he thought
Mr. Smurthwaite was "checkin1 on 'em," and that that surmise
was reasonable.

The universe of arguable record support for

that contention appears to consist of the following:
(a)

that, according to the testimony of Mr. Painter's

witness, Robert Child (admitted over hearsay objection, allowed
on what District Court found to be a "state of mind" exception),
Mr. Painter stated that he thought Mr. Smurthwaite was "checking
on" the horses; (Tr., Vol. II, at 184);
(b)

that Mr. Painter may have thought that

Mr. Smurthwaite was able to climb over a sewage treatment
plant fence to check on the condition of his horses (Tr.,
Vol. II, at 220-225);
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(c)

that Mr. Painter testified that he, himself,

would have gone down to check on the horses if he had not
thought that Mr. Smurthwaite was checking on them (Tr.,
Vol. II, at 244);
(d)

that Mr. Painter testified that he said to

Mr. Smurthwaite shortly before Mr. Smurthwaite discovered that
his horses had died:

"Haven't you been checking your horses?

That's your responsibility."

(Tr., Vol. II, p. 245.)

(That

statement was made, if it was made, on February 5, 1984 (tr.,
Vol. II, at 60) when the horses were, in all likelihood,
already dead (see, Tr., Vol. II, at 135; Vol. Ill, at 47-48,
54) . ) ; and
(e)

that Mr. Painter testified that he would have

called Mr. Smurthwaite if he had actually seen horses with
their ribs sticking out, but that he "figured [Mr. Smurthwaite]
was checkin' on

f

em."

(Tr., Vol. Ill, at 15).

The fact remains that Mr. Painter, who knew horses could
die of starvation (tr., Vol. II, at 263), and who heard that
animals were starving to death and that the Humane Society was
investigating (tr., Vol. II, at 266-67), did absolutely nothing,
did not even pick up his telephone (tr., Vol. II, at 267) to
discharge his duty of care to Mr. Smurthwaite.
Mr. Smurthwaite contends (1) that these pieces of evidence do not, individually or in the aggregate, provide the
traditionally requisite "substantial support" for the District
Court's putative finding that Mr. Painter was not negligent;
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and (2) that application of the "clearly erroneous" standard
suggested for adoption in Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co.,
711 P.2d 250, 252-53, n.2 (Utah 1985) would, a fortiori, lead
to the conclusion that such a putative finding be rejected.
Finally, and, as indicated hereinabove (at p. 21), and
lest the Court have any doubt, the evidence adduced at trial
clearly supports the proposition, for actual and proximate
causation purposes, that the deaths of the horses would not
have occurred but for Mr. Painter's negligent failure to
inform Mr. Smurthwaite of the condition of the horses.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between the parties was an agistment bailment.

Mr. Smurthwaite1s horses were delivered to Mr. Painter's

property in good condition and were in good condition the last
time Mr. Smurthwaite saw them.

The horses died.

Mr. Painter

failed to demonstrate that he was not negligent (or that he
acted as a "reasonable owner" would have) in connection with
the events pertinent hereto and to the deaths of the horses.
There was, accordingly and as a matter of agistment bailment law,
no reason for the District Court to consider Mr. Smurthwaite's
supposed negligence in failing to inspect his horses. Had
Mr. Smurthwaite known what was happening, his horses would not
have starved to death.
Mr. Smurthwaite was entitled to Judgment in the District
Court proceedings and remains so entitled, in an amount to be
determined on remand, based on the principal amount of the
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values of Mr- Smurthwaite1s horses as of December, 1983, plus
interest accruing thereon subsequent thereto, plus compensable
costs-

And Mr. Smurthwaite respectfully urges this Court so

to rule.
DATED this ^'J^r^day of October, 1986^.
WINDER &

By:
Peter C. Collins
Attorneys for (Plaintiff)
Appellant
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I hereby certify that, on October 20, 1986, I "lodged"
with the Court, pursuant to procedures explained to me by a
representative of the Office of the Clerk of the Utah Supreme
Court, a nearly final draft of the foregoing Appellant's Brief
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ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE
Plaintiff,

-'^;T7Tn.In

:
:

vs.

:

JOHN PAINTER,

:

Defendant,

CuU/17

_

RULING

Case No.

2-36259

:

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing
before the above-entitled Court and the Court having heard the
testimony of the witnesses and having reviewed the evidence
herein, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby rules as
follows:
1.

That defendant Painter owns and leases certain property

in Davis County, State of Utah.
2.

That the land in question is divided into one 40 acre

cultivated parcel with approximately 10 acres of pasture referred
to as the upper pasture and a second 350 acre parcel consisting
of pasture referred to as the lower pasture.

The parcels are

separated by a large drainage ditch running approximately east
and west.
3.

The plaintiff is an experienced horseman having been

involved in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68.

FILMED
i
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4.

The plaintiff, in addition to his experience, has taken

many classes on horse care and was aware that a horse could die
in two to four weeks from starvation.
5.

That the defendant is not an experienced horseman.

6.

That defendant resides adjacent to the upper pasture.

7.

That the lower pasture is not observable from the barn

area or the home on the upper pasture.
8.

That the plaintiff and defendant entered into an

agreement whereby it was agreed that plaintiff could pasture his
horses on defendant's property for $15.00 per head payable at the
end of each month.
9.

That the defendant had no responsibility to feed or

check the horses or even to maintain fences.
10.

That plaintiff had free access to property to come and

go as warranted and to move the horses in and out as he saw fit
with no contact or interference with from the defendant.
11.

That the agreement was from month to month.

12.

That the horses were brought by the plaintiff and

placed on the upper pasture in October of 1981.
13.

That the horses were moved down on the lower pasture in

the spring of 1982.
14.

That it is not clear from the evidence who moved them.

15.

Plaintiff made no objection to the fact that the horses

were on the lower pasture.
16.

That the lower pasture had good grass and water.

ii
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17.

That in the fall of 1982, 300 head of yearling sheep

were placed on the upper pasture by one, Childs, and then in
November of 1982 through April of 1983, 600 to 700 head of sheep
and 4 head of horses and a trailer were placed on the property by
Mr. Marriot all of which was authorized by the defendant.
18.

That in the fall of 1983, 120 head of sheep were placed

on the upper pasture by Mr. Childs from October until December 24
and 7 to 10 head of horses were placed on the same parcel from
November of 1983 to April of 1984.
19.

That plaintiff testified that he inspected his horses

every day in the fall and winter of 1981 and 1982; then 3 to 4
times each week.
pasture.
20.

That he observed the sheep in the north

The same was testified to also by plaintiff's nephew.
During the winter of 1982 and 1983 plaintiff inspected

the horses at least 12 times over the winter.
21.

The horses remained in the lower pasture from the

spring of 1982 until they were taken out in June of 1984 and
plaintiff at no time ever objected to their being in the lower
pasture.
22.

The winter of 1983-84 was a very severe winter.

23.

That the plaintiff at all times relevant to this matter

resided in Murray, Utah.
24.

The snow began falling in November of 1983.

25.

That plaintiff inspected the horses on December 5,

1983, in the lower pasture and never inspected the horses again

iii
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until February 4, 1984, and then only from the road where he
could not identify his horses as they were too far away,
26.

That plaintiff finally on February 7, 1984 walked down

in the lower pasture to inspect his horses and found several
d e a d .

•

27.

•••.•.-,

s:.:<,

Plaintiff never at any time complained to defendant

about the horses being in the lower pasture or about other
livestock being in the upper pasture.
28.

The lower pasture had three means of access; one

through the defendant's farm, one through the sewer plant
property and one on the south end of the 350 acre parcel by
Miller pond.
29.

The sewer plant access was paved and was kept plowed in

the winter.
30.

That the plaintiff had used the sewer plant access at

least six times prior to the 1983-84 winter to move the horse in
and out. •?;•,.
31.

That plaintiff, upon finding his dead horses, indicated

to defendant that he had "goofed up" allowing the horses to die
and was about out of the horse business.
32.

That defendant was working full-time at his regular job

during the winter of 1983-84 as he had at all times previous and
during that winter never went into the fields and never saw any
of plaintiff's horses.
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From the foregoing the Court concludes that the agreement
between the parties was one for pasturage rental only.

That

defendant had no responsibility to feed or care for plaintiff's
animals nor to inspect them or even repair the fences.
That the said agreement did not apply to any particular
parcel of defendant's land.
The Court concludes that the agreement between the parties
was not an agistment agreement which requires in all cases that
the person sought to be charged has some contractual
responsibility for the care of the livestock.
The Court concludes that the defendant did not breach the
agreement between the parties.
The Court further concludes that the defendant had no duty
to care for the livestock or inspect the animals nor even to
report on their condition under the circumstances of this case.
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out that duty,
the Court would conclude that plaintiff in failing to inspect his
stock from December 5, 1983, to February 7, 1984, was negligent
himself and that said negligence was at least equal to, if not
greater, than that of the defendant.
From the foregoing the Court grants judgment to the
defendant and dismisses plaintiff's complaint for no cause of
action.

v
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Defendant's counsel to prepare Findings and Judgment in
accordance with the Court's ruling.
DATED this

|q~Hv

day of June, A.D. 1986.
BY THE COURT:

ys<*-

(rti\
District
/Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Ruling to Peter Collins, 175 West 200 South, Suite
4004, Salt Lake City, Utah

84101, and to Taylor D. Carr, 350

South 400 East, Suite 114, Salt Lake City, Utah
prepaid on the

/f

84111 postage

day of June, A.D^, 1986.

Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE,

i
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,

<

VS.

'

Civil No.

2-36259

JOHN PAINTER,
Defendant.

I

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled Court on May 21, 1986, and the
Court having heard the testimony of the witnesses and having
reviewed the evidence herein, and being fully advised in
the premises, hereby finds and rules as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That defendant Painter owns and leases certain pro-

perty in Davis County, State of Utah.
2.

That the land in question is divided into one 40

acre cultivated parcel with approximately 10 acres of pasture
referred to as the upper pasture and a second 350 acre parcel
consisting of pasture referred to as the lower pasture.
The parcels are separated by a large drainage ditch running
approximately east and west,

"

1

•

•

'
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3.

The plaintiff is an experienced horseman having

been involved in the Appaloosa breeding business since 1967-68.
4.

The plaintiff, in addition to his experience, has

taken many classes on horse care and was aware that a horse
could die in two to four weeks from starvation.
5.

That the defendant is not an experienced horseman.

6.

That defendant resides adjacent to the upper pasture.

7.

That the lower pasture is not observable from the

barn area or the home on the upper pasture.
8.

That the plaintiff and defendant entered into an

agreement whereby it was agreed that plaintiff could pasture
his horses on defendant's property for $15.00 per head payable
at the end of each month.
9.

That the defendant had no responsibility to feed

or check the horses or even maintain fences.
10.

That plaintiff had free access to property to come

and go as warranted and to move the horses in and out as
he saw fit with no contact or interference with or from the
defendant.
11.

That the agreement was from month to month.

12.

That the horses were brought by the plaintiff and

placed on the upper pasture in October of 1981.
13.

That the horses were moved down on the lower pasture

in the Spring of 1982.
14.

That it is not clear from the evidence who moved
2

"
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them.
15.

Plaintiff made no objection to the fact that the

horses were on the lower pasture.
16.

That the lower pasture had good grass and water.

17.

That in the Fall of 1982, 300 head of yearling

sheep were placed on the upper pasture by one, ChiIds, and
then in November of 1982 through April of 1983, 600 to 700
head of sheep and 4 head of horses and a trailer were placed
on the property by Mr. Marriot all of which was authorized
by the defendant.
18.

That in the Fall of 1983, 120 head of sheep were

placed on the upper pasture by Mr. ChiIds from October until
December 24 and 7 to 10 head of horses were placed on the
same parcel from November of 1983 to April of 1984.
19.

That plaintiff testified that he inspected his

horses every day in the Fall and Winter of 1981 and 1982;
then 3 to 4 times each week.
on the north pasture.

That he observed the sheep

The same was testified to also by

plaintiff's nephew.
20.

During the Winter of 1982 and 1983 plaintiff in-

spected the horses at least 12 times over the Winter.
21.

The horses remained in the lower pasture from the

Spring of 1982 until they were taken out in June 1984 and
plaintiff at no time ever objected to their being in the
lower pasture.
3.
ix
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22. The winter of 1983-84 was a very severe winter.
23.

That the plaintiff at all times relevant to this

matter resided in Murray, Utah.
24.

The snow began falling in November of 1983.

25.

That plaintiff inspected the horses on December

5, 1983, in the lower pasture and never inspected the horses
again until February 4, 1984 and then only from the road
where he could not identify his horses as they were too far
':s

away.
26.

That plaintiff finally on February 7, 1984 walked

down in the lower pasture to inspect his horses and found
several dead.
27.

Plaintiff never at any time complained to defendant

about the horses being in the lower pasture or about other
livestock being in the upper pasture.
28.

The lower pasture had three means of access; one

through the defendant's farm, one through the sewer plant
property and one on the south end on the 350 acre parcel
by Miller pond.
29.

The sewer plant access was paved and was kept plowed

in the winter.
30.

That the plaintiff had used the sewer plant access

at least six times prior to the 1983-84 winter to move the
horses in and out.
31. That plaintiff, upon finding his dead horses, in-
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dicated to defendant that he had "goofed up" allowing the
horses to die and was about out of the horse business.
32.

That defendant was working full-time at this regular

job during the winter of 1983-84 as he had at all times previous and during that winter never went into the fields and
never saw any of plaintiff's horses.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
From the foregoing the Court concludes that the agreement
between the parties was one for pasturage rental only. That
defendant had no responsibility to feed or care for plaintiff's
animals nor to inspect them or even repair the fences.
That the said agreement did not apply to any particular
parcel of defendant's land.
The Court concludes that the agreement between the parties
was not an agistment agreement which requires in all cases
that the person sought to be charged has some contractual
responsibility for the care of the livestock.
The Court concludes that the defendant did not breach
the agreement between the parties.
The Court further concludes that the defendant had no
duty to care for the livestock or inspect the animals nor
even to report on their condition under the circumstances
of this case.
Even, however, assuming that such a duty existed and
defendant were found to be negligent in carrying out that
..

5
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duty, the Court would conclude that plaintiff in failing
to inspect his stock from December 5, 1983, to February 7,
1984, was negligent himself and that said negligence was
at least equal to, if not greater, than that of the defendant.
From the foregoing the Court concludes that judgment
should be granted to the defendant and plaintiff's complaint
should be dismissed for no cause of action.
DATED this

/fffo day of

^-LJL

, 1986.

BY THE COURT:

&.~J- Q^

S
RODtfEY S. IP5GE
District^Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, postage prepaid this # 3

day of

1986, to:
Peter Collins
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

6
xii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C-/
FILED !H Ci.cRK-2 OFrlCr
D/.Vi?. C '/.:'{]':. L'T/.H

I338 JUL II Hi 9= 5 8

TAYLOR D. CARR - A0582
Attorney for Defendant
350 South 400 East, Suite 114
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALFRED T. SMURTHWAITE,
J U D G M E N T

Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil No.

2-36259

JOHN PAINTER,
Defendant.

The above entitled matter having been duly tried, on
May 21, 22 and 28, 1986, without jury, the Honorable Rodney
S. Page, District Court Judge, presiding, the parties having
been represented by their respective counsel, Peter C. Collins
for plaintiff, and Taylor D. Carr for defendant, and the
court having heard the testimony of witnesses and having
reviewed the evidence presented, and upon due consideration,
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that JUDGMENT is entered in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff and plaintiff's complaint
is hereby dismissed for no cause of action with prejudice,
and upon the merits.
DATED

this

) f l ^ day of

4ui

,

T

1986.

BY THE COURT:

A

P£
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Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing JUDGMENT, postage prepaid this
#3

day of

(\z4snJU

, 1986, to:

Peter Collins
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Legal Aspects Of A Horse Bailment
ftoMWltxtog:<asJUL4D

Before we delve into the different phases of a bailment, let's represents to the bailee that the riding horse is of gentle disposidetermine the meaning of this term. In its broadest definition bail- tion when, in fact, the bailor knows the contrary, the bailor has
ment is the lawful possession of an animal by someone other than breached an implied warranty of fitness for the particular purthe owner. Examples of a bailment are: a stallion that spends but pose and breached the bailment.
one day on another's ranch; a rider who rents a horse for a few
This warranty of fitness is not an insurance agreement. The
hours of pleasure; a horse is boarded on a monthly basis. In all warranty is to take into account the nature of the horse and the
the aforementioned circumstances, possession of the equine is expectation of the bailee. In a California court proceeding,
in the hands of someone who is not its legal owner.
"an owner, furnishing a horse for hire, was not required to inNow that the bailee (one who receives and has possession of form theriderthat the horse was a jumper nnW<; there was reason
the animal) is the "holder" of the horse, what are his basic obliga- to believe that the horse would jump when not feeing a
tions? First, he is to properly care and tend to the animal; second, hurdle . . . "
he is to see that no harm befalls the animal while in his custody;
As might be expected, since the bailee has physical possession
and third, the horse is to be returned to the bailor (legal owner of the horse, his duties are more numerous and detailed. One of
of the horse) in as good a condition as when originally entrusted the duties of a bailee is to return the bailed animal, either * t «
to him.
set time or on demand, to the bailor or someone designated by • H
As there are obligations imposed on the bailee, there are stipula- \the bailor, in at least as good a condition as it was received.
tions the bailor is to recognize. If the horse is let for a trail ride,
The majority of problems arise over the question of the bailee's
the bailor implies that the animal is capable of performing the -duty of care toward the horse in his physical possession. The term
journey for which it was let. When the horse is bailed, the owner "care" is not just the obligation of providing adequate food, water
is obligated to inform the bailee of any habits of the aiiimal with and shelter, but the general obligation to refrain from any behavior
3*
respect to safety of the bailee and the safety of others. If the bailor which could result in harm to the bailed horse.
does not fulfill any of his obligations, he is in breach of a bailment.
As to what is reasonable care, some factors that ought to be con- %
In a bailment there is a relationship between the parties which sidered are:
*=$
normally arises by an expressed agreement, either written or oral.
—the nature and purpose of the bailment, whether it is for pay
In certain situations, however, a bailment will be implied as a or a gratuitous gesture;
result of the circumstance. For example, when a horse is rented
—the pedigree and/or value of the equine;
for a ride a bailment is created as a matter of law. This is so even
—any special duties within the bailment agreement;
in the absence of any agreement or discussion between the parties.
—the prior practice between the parties and the practice of bailFor the creation of a bailment two elements are a must. First, ment in the particular area;
there is to be a physical delivery of the equine to the bailee; and
—any special knowledge that is to be disclosed by bailor to
second, there has to be a knowing acceptance of the horse by the bailee; and
bailee. Let's look at two examples to see the difference:
—any special needs of the horse to be made known to bailee^
{a) Mr. Smith, owner of a horse, contacts Mr. Jones, who agrees me While the bailee is to observe the above, he must comply with
nihiimum standards of a horse hailr^^pt lill I h i a t a l mill
to keep the horse for the summer for a fee of $ 100 per mcnth. A\
*
adequate
food, water and shelter. This, however, does riot make
Mr. Jones is late in picking up the horse and, in the interval,
the horse is injured before Mr. Jones arrives. Even though an the bailee an insurer of the horse. If unusual cr extraordinary
agreement exists, because there has been no physical transfer events occur, the bailee's duty is to contact the bailor and get fur• or the bailee's possession, no bailment has as yet a r i s e n . ^ ther instructions. For example; whereas ordinary veterinary ex-J
penses may be part of bailee's duty, if an unusual illness or acci(b) Mr. Smith, owner of a horse, delivers the horse to Mr. Jones'
dent occurs, the bailee may not have the duty to incur large or
ranch without prior contact with Mr. Jones—Mr. Jones is away.
abnormally high veterinary expenses. The proper course for the
Jones discoveres the horse the next day. At this point there
bailee would be to contact the bailor.
is no bailment because there has been no knowing acceptance
The easiest situation for the bailor is when the bailee delivers
by the bailee, Mr. Jones. If a subsequent agreement is reachthe bailed horse to a third party without authorization from the
ed on suitable terms the bailment will immediately commence. bailor. At this point the bailee is liable for the value of the horse.
Prior to agreement, Mr. Jones would be in a position of an in- This is so, as the bailee is under an absolute duty to redeliver the
voluntary bailee, with no duty of care toward the horse.
horse to thW bailor.
Since the bailor is parting with physical possession of the horse,
The majority of bailment cases to reach the courtroom are a
his duties are fairly limited. His primary duty is to provide the result of injury or death to the animal while in possession of the
proper type of horse to the bailee. This duty is expressed in terms bailee. In a predicament of this sort the bailor merely has to show
of an implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose of 'that (1) the existence of a bailment between the parties; (2) delivery
the bailment. The law will implythis warranty even in the absence |of the animal to the possession of the bailee; and (3) failure of
of any discussion amongst the parties. Thus,'when the bailor
le bailee to redeliver the animal undamaged.
98
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Once the bailor has shown these facts, a presumption of
negligence is cast against the bailee. An Ohio court proceeding
^exemplified this point, saying (paraphrased): "Owner of a mare
\ brings the animal to bailee's ranch for breeding existed, a delivery
^J and subsequent injury and death of the bailed mare allows a
/ presumption of negligence on the part of the bailee.'"
/ Now it is up to the bailee to show that the injury or loss came
[ about other than through his negligence. If this can be proved,
i the bailee will be absolved of any blame. If, on the other hand,
[ the bailee has a lack of knowledge, as to how the injury occuri red, he will be found negligent and thus responsible to the bailor.
The reasoning behind the above discussion is explained thusly: The bailee is in physical control of the animal and, as it is
unlikely that the bailor is present when the injury occurred, it
would be inappropriate to require the bailor to prove something
be has no knowledge of. Also, the bailee is in possession of the
bailed animal and may have the best or even the only knowledge
of the events leading to the injury.
To mollify the extreme consequence that may befall the bailee,
a signed agreement between the parties may be helpful. If the
bailee and bailor sign an agreement to hold the bailee harmless
in the event of injury or death, the bailee may be released from
• the effects of negligence, although perhaps not willful negligence.
We have discussed the bailee's responsibilities in a bailment
but when is the bailor liable for injuries to bailee even though
he does not have control of the horse at the time? The majority
of cases in this category arise out of the hiring of horses for riding.
In horse rentals, the bailor, owner of the riding academy, warrants the animal will be fit for the particular purpose of the bailment. One does not rent an untrained or high-spirited horse to

a novice naer. ine warranty \Ooiimen;; is oreacnea eiixier wnen
the bailor hfi||^pwledge of the unsuitataj^k or was negligent
in detenninjPRe suitability of the horse ^ p l e particular riderbailee.
Another basis whereby the bailor may be deemed responsible
is where he makes explicit statements about the gentleness of the
horse knowing this is not true. It is to be remembered that if the
bailor has knowledge of a horse's dangerous traits and does not
disclose this to the bailee, then he may be liable if an injury occurs.
A further question to be answered—who is responsible if an
injury befalls a third person by the bailed horse? Is it the bailor
or the bailee?
When the injury is caused solely by the negligence of the bailee,
the bailor is not liable. However, in certain situations, the bailor
would be liable as (1) when he had knowledge of a dangerous
trait in the animal; (2) fails to disclose salient information to bailee
concerning the horse; (3) state or local law imposes liability on
the owner of the horse; and (4) bailor fails to provide an appropriate horse for the bailment.
As there is the formation of a bailment, so there is the termination of a bailment. In this respect a bailment comes to an end by
(1) full performance of the bailment purpose; (2) mutual consent
of the parties; (3) bailee's wrong, at the option of the bailor; (4)
death of either party; (5) destruction of the bailed animal; or (6)
in some instances, legal status of the parties.
Were one to look back at early jurisprudence, mention is made
of bailments in the Book of Exodus. Expressions such as, "If a
man shall deliver unto his neighbor money or stuff" or "If a man
borrow aught of his neighbor," were bailments then and, even
in our modern thinking, are bailments. From years back till today, bailment of horses, as other goods and products, is a legal
matter that is of importance although not too well understood by
the legal profession and less understood by the layperson. ^ T
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1978 Red Dun
Stud Fee: $500
Booking Fee: $100
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CONTACT:
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Billy or Michael Thomas
P.O. Box 2371
Jackson. Miss. 39205
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High Point Aged Stallion
Mississippi Appaloosa Horse Club
19 Lifetime Halter Points
7 Senior Western Pleasure Lifetime Points
(Limited Showing)
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Managed by Ernie King .
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84110-2668
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PETER C. COLLINS

COURT qyjSSfti

ERED

A p r i l 29, 1988

Mr. Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals
400 Midtown Plaza
230 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:
Smurthwaite v. Painter
Court of Appeals No. 880073-CA
Dear Mr. Shea:
I represent Alfred T. Smurthwaite, the plaintiff and appellant in the above-referenced case. The case was argued
Wednesday, April 27, 1988, before a panel consisting of
Judges Davidson, Garff, and Jackson.
I am submitting this letter citation of supplemental
authorities (with five copies), pursuant to Rule 24(j) of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
1.

The question of whether a pasturage agreement is a rental
arrangement or an agistment bailment arrangement (the
question which is at the heart of this appeal) is discussed in Appellant's Brief at 9-19; Respondent's Brief
at 5-10; and Appellant's Reply Brief at 5-7. It was
also discussed several times during oral argument. A
case clearly holding that a person who takes in and
pastures animals on his land for reward is not a landlord but an agistor, and that the person who owns the
animals is not a tenant or lessee is Cox v. Chase, 163
Pac.
184 (Kan. 1917). (The earlier opinion in that
same dispute, reported at 148 Pac. 766 (Kan. 1915) may
also be of interest on the duty-to-notify aspect of the
instant case; (this argued duty, and Mr. Smurthwaite1s
contention that Mr. Painter's failure to notify him
constituted negligence, are discussed in Appellant's
Brief at 16-24)) .
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During oral argument, Judge Garff posed a question concerning federal Bureau of Land Management and/or Utah
Board of State Lands potential liability, by virtue of
their putative "bailee" status, with respect to animals
placed on public lands, by their owners, for grazing
purposes. I indicated, in my rebuttal argument, that
that question might be governed by statutory, or regulatory law. It does appear to be so governed, under
both state and federal statutes (respectively, Utah
Code Ann. §§4-20-1, et seq., and 65-1-44, and 43 U.S.C.
§§ 315, et seq.); and also under state and federal regulations (respectively, Utah Admin. Code R632-50-1, et
seq., and 43 C.F.R. Parts 4100 (see, esp., 43 C.F.R.
§§4130 and 4130.5)).
The essence of these statutes and rules, for present
purposes, seems to be, unlike the situation in the
purely private context of the instant litigation, which
arguably involves Utah Code Ann. §38-2-1 (the agistor's
lien statute), that: (1) public "grazing permit" entitlements are in the nature of leases (see, Utah Code Ann.
§65-1-44); (2) at least with respect to state lands,
all payments are to be made in advance, and non-payment
works a forfeiture (see, Utah Admin. Code R632-50-6);
(3) if, at least with respect to federal lands, the
animals are on public lands in excess of authorized
permit use, a trespass is worked (see Holland Livestock
Ranch v. United States, 655 F.2d 1002 (9th Cir. 1981));
civil and criminal penalties may be imposed (43 C.F.R.
§4150.1); and impoundment may be ordered (43 C.F.R.
§4150.4); (4) apparently (our research has unearthed no
statute, regulation, or case dealing with the question)
no lien right is created in the government, state or
federal, by virtue of non-payment; and (5) there is,
apparently (we have likewise found no law on this point),
no "bailee" liability even arguably to be imposed if
the animals die or are injured while on the public land
that is the subject of the permit or lease.
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The most recent case we have unearthed, and the one
with perhaps the clearest and most helpful discussions
of the concept and application of burden-shifting mechanisms in agistment bailment cases is Gebert v. Yank,
172 Cal. App. 3d 552, 218 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. App.
1985). These mechanisms are discussed in Appellant's
Brief at 9-10 and 19-20.
With respect to the "reasonably prudent owner" standard
of care for agistment bailees (or "agistors") (discussed
at page 12 of Appellant's Brief), a case whose factual
background and legal analysis might be of particular
interest to the Court is Nutt v. Davison, 131 Pac. 390
(Colo. 1913).
At the time the briefing in this case was done, it was
unclear whether the appropriate standard of review of
trial courts' bench trials findings of fact was the
"substantial evidence" standard or the "clearly erroneous" standard. See Appellant's Brief at 23-24 with
respect to this then-uncertainty. Pursuant to an
amendment to Rule 52 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, effective January 1, 1987, it appears that
the "clearly erroneous" standard is now the one to be
applied. As was suggested during oral argument,
Mr. Smurthwaite's position is that the trial court's
Finding of Fact No. 10 (appearing at page viii of the
Appendix to Appellant's Brief) was "clearly erroneous,"
insofar as it states that he was able "to move the
horses in and out as he saw fit . . . " and insofar as
it pertains to time periods including December, 1983,
and January and February, 1984, during which he was in
arrears on his monthly payment obligation to Mr. Painter,
and in light of the Utah adistor's lien statute (Utah
Code Ann., §38-2-1) and during which the horses were
dying.
As is made clear by such cases as Western Kane County
Special Service Dist. No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744
P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987), "no special diference" is to be
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accorded by the Utah appellate courts to trial courts'
Conclusions of Law. This standard-of-review question,
critical to the Court's determination of Mr. Smurthwaite's
appeal, was not expressly addressed in any brief or at
oral argument. It may be necessary, however, for this
Court to keep it in mind as it deliberates in this
case, in light of Mr. Smurthwaite1s contention that the
following unnumbered "conclusions of law," discussed in
Appellant's Brief at 20, and appearing at page xi of
the Appendix to Appellant's Brief, were erroneous:
The Court concludes that the agreement between
the parties was not an agistment agreement
which requires in all cases that the person
sought to be charged has some contractual
responsibility for the care of the livestock.

The Court further concludes that the defendant had no duty to care for the livestock or
inspect the animals nor even to report on
their condition under the circumstances of
this case.
Respectfully

PETER C. COLLINS
PCC/skt
Enclosure (5 copies)
cc:

Taylor D. Carr
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
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